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Article

“Macro-Transparency” as Structural
Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance
Controversy
Heidi Kitrosser†
In December 2005, the New York Times broke a shocking
story. For roughly four years, the National Security Agency
(NSA) had run a secret surveillance program in which it spied
without warrants on thousands of calls made between the
United States and foreign nations.1 It soon was revealed that
the Bush administration had authorized the program through
secret executive order in 2002.2 Critics charged that the administration was violating the law by circumventing the requirements outlined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA).3 The administration defended the program’s legality4 and expressed fury at the public disclosure of the program’s
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I
thank Mike Paulsen for his insightful suggestions. I also thank the students of
the Minnesota Law Review for organizing a terrific symposium and for their
work in editing this piece. Copyright © 2007 by Heidi Kitrosser.
1. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR
43−44 (2006); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Eavesdropping Effort Began
Soon After Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A44; David E.
Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2005, at A1.
2. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 44; Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan
& Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Congressional Research Service 2
(Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (addressing presidential authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence information).
3. See, e.g., RISEN, supra note 1, at 44−59; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2,
at 42−44; Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,
2005, at A21; George F. Will, Editorial, No Checks, Many Imbalances, WASH.
POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at A27.
4. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter
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existence.5 A common point in the administration’s defensive
and offensive positions is that the program’s very existence
needed to be kept secret.6 The administration’s offensive position is that the program’s existence should never have been
leaked and that any leakers may be prosecuted.7 The administration’s defensive position is that the program and its secrecy
were national security necessities and that existing statutes,
not to mention Article II of the Constitution, should be read as
authorizing the program and its secrecy.8
This umpteenth call for national security secrecy by the
Bush administration9 gets the Constitution’s approach to information control dangerously wrong. This Article focuses on
this mistake’s manifestation in the administration’s defense of
the program and its secrecy.10 The administration’s defense
suggests a false choice between complete secrecy and complete
openness. It also suggests a parallel false choice between nearcomplete presidential discretion and an ineffective national security system. Additionally, the administration’s defense
wrongly assumes that the Constitution poses these choices.
These errors stem from two fundamental problems in the
administration’s reading of the Constitution. First, the administration dramatically overreads the President’s discretion to
act, in the name of national security, in contravention of specific statutory mandates. It overlooks, in short, the Constitution’s careful balance of powers between the legislative and exDOJ WHITE PAPER].
5. See Bruce Ackerman, The Secrets They Keep, SLATE, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2132811; Editorial, On the Subject of Leaks, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at A14; Sanger, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 40−41.
7. See Ackerman, supra note 5; Editorial, supra note 5; Sanger, supra
note 1; see also Bob Herbert, Do You Know What They Know?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2006, at A23; Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the “New York Times” Violated
the Espionage Act?, COMMENTARY, Mar. 2006, http://www.commentarymagazine
.com/cm/main/viewArticle.aip?article=com.commentarymagazine.content.Article::
10136; Scott Shane, Leak of Classified Information Prompts Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2006, at A10; Scott Sherman, Chilling the Press, THE NATION,
July 17, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060717/sherman.
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. For a general discussion of rampant secrecy in the Bush administration, see Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007).
10. While this mistake also manifests itself in the administration’s call for
leak prosecutions, that topic is beyond this Article’s scope. For such a discussion, see Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech (2007)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=958099.
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ecutive branches. Second, the administration misconstrues the
relationship between this balance and information control. An
important reason for this balance’s very existence, as evidenced
by constitutional history, text, and structure, is to reconcile the
democratic virtues of government transparency with the occasional need for government secrecy. The Constitution reconciles
these factors by effectively mandating what this Article calls
“macro-transparency” in governing, while leaving room for “micro-secrecy.” The macro-transparency directive is that law execution must be traceable to publicly created and publicly known
laws, even if those laws allow their execution to occur in secret
(that is, even if they allow micro-secrecy). This point raises
many questions of application, including how narrow legislation must be to be sufficiently transparent, whether legislative
oversight of law execution may itself occur in secret and
whether there are emergency exceptions to the general rule of
micro-secrecy. For introductory purposes, though, what is important is to understand the general directive of macrotransparency and its accompanying allowance of micro-secrecy.
The administration’s first error—its overreading of presidential discretion to ignore specific statutory mandates—has
been noted by many critics of the NSA program.11 While the
program’s secrecy also has been criticized,12 the connection between that secrecy and the administration’s first, more basic
error, has not been considered in much depth.13 Thus, the tension between the relatively transparent legislative process and
the need for secrecy has not been meaningfully explored. Nor
has the constitutional balance between macro and microsecrecy and its ability to resolve this tension been identified.
These points are very important. Without them, the arguments
that the Constitution provides for some presidential secrecy
and that near-complete secrecy was called for in this case are
not fully answered. Furthermore, it is important more gener11. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 44−59; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at
42−44; Daschle, supra note 3; Will, supra note 3; see also John Cary Sims,
What the NSA is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105,
105−40 (2006); Memorandum from David Kris, Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 25, 2006), http://balkan.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5; Daniel J. Solove, How Much Government Secrecy Is Really Necessary?, Dec. 17, 2005, http://
concurringopinions.com/achives/2005/12.
13. See Heidi Kitrosser, Presidential Secrecy and the NSA Spying Controversy, JURIST, Feb. 27, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/02/
presidential-secrecy-and-nsa-spying.php.

KITROSSER_4FMT

1166

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1163

ally to understand the Constitution’s macro-transparency directive and its connection to the legislature/executive relationship. As I have explained elsewhere, the failure to perceive this
directive lends itself to a troubling over-reliance on executive
branch discretion to operate in secret.14 Without an understanding of this directive, such discretion is seen as the only alternative to unchecked openness. The practical results of such
misunderstanding range from the dramatic overclassification of
information with few checks on the same, to the invocation of
executive privilege as a talisman to keep information from
Congress and the public.15
This Article explores the Constitution’s macrotransparency directive and its connection to the legislature/executive relationship, using two NSA surveillance controversies, one past and one present, as analytical foci. Part I explains the textual, structural and historical basis for the
Constitution’s macro-transparency directive. Part II discusses
the NSA surveillance controversies of the 1970s and congressional reaction thereto, including the creation of FISA and accompanying oversight provisions. Part II explains that these
episodes shed much light on the wisdom of the macrotransparency directive and on the importance of vigilance by
Congress and the public to ensure the directive’s preservation.
Part III discusses the current NSA controversy and the administration’s defense of its post-9/11 NSA program. Part III cites
the many constitutional errors in the administration’s defense
of the program and their common bases in the misuse of the
concept of national security secrecy and in the overlooking of
the macro-transparency directive. This Article concludes by
discussing congressional reactions since the press revealed the
post-9/11 program’s existence, and what these reactions tell us
about the value—and the limitations—of the macrotransparency directive.

14. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 510−36.
15. See id.
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I. THE CONSTITUTION’S MACRO-TRANSPARENCY
DIRECTIVE
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
POWERS
This Subpart outlines the respective macro-policy and micro-implementation/execution roles of the legislature and executive. It does so for two reasons. First, although aspects of
the relationship are obvious, we live in an era that has bred
vast claims for unchecked presidential power.16 As such, it is
important to detail the legislature’s function relative to that of
the executive. It is particularly important to explain why national security-related governance exists, like other matters,
within this general framework. Second, the macro-/microframework is a useful way to conceptualize the legislature/executive relationship. For one thing, the framework helps
us to identify the common qualities of the legislature/executive
relationship in military and non-military contexts. Most important for our purposes, understanding the macro-/microframework lends itself to an understanding of the parallel
framework with respect to government information control.
It is useful to begin with an understanding of the general
purpose that underscores the relationship between macropolicymaking legislature and micro-implementing executive. As
a matter of logical inference from text and structure, the purpose appears to be to balance the liberty-enhancing features of
the legislature with the energy and efficacy-enhancing features
of the executive. The legislature’s features, including its numerical breadth and its formal, dialogic, dual-chamber and
dual-branch processes17 seem directed at enhancing liberty by
restraining hasty, ill-considered, secretive government action.18
The executive’s features, including a single President and his
broad directives to execute the law and to command military
forces,19 seem designed to ensure an executive who can safely
and urgently carry out the policies of the legislature.20 These
16. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006,
at 44−55; Jeffrey Rosen, The Power of One, NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at
8−10.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
18. See Adrian Vermuele, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 387 (2005).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. §§ 2−3.
20. See Gerhard Caspers, The American Constitutional Traditions of
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combined features thus seem designed to ensure the country’s
capacity to protect itself and otherwise to act quickly and efficiently when necessary, and to guarantee deliberation and
transparency in crafting the larger framework within which
such actions occur.
These logical inferences are bolstered by history. James
Madison, writing as Publius, identified a key challenge of the
Constitution’s drafting to be “combining the requisite stability
and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to
liberty and to the republican form.”21 Alexander Hamilton took
up this challenge in assessing the executive branch in particular. He rhetorically asked Federalist Paper readers whether the
executive branch balances “all the requisites to energy” against
“the requisites to safety, in the republican sense—a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility.”22 He concluded
that this balance is achieved largely through legislative checking.23
1. Legislation, Excluding Military Activities
The Constitution plainly establishes a framework wherein
the legislature sets the nation’s policy on a macro level.24 Execution, and thus the relative micro-detail work of implementing
the legislative big picture, falls to the executive branch.25 Article I, Section 8 lays out the legislature’s policymaking domain.26
Among the legislature’s most important powers are its abilities
to raise funds through taxation and borrowing, to coin money
and set its value and to “provide for the . . . general Welfare”
through spending.27 Article I, Section 9 makes clear that “[n]o
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law.”28 These provisions mark an
attempt to ensure that the executive, while spending and enforcing revenue-raising measures with energy and efficiency,
Shared and Separated Powers: An Essay in Separation of Powers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 234−41 (1989).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 194 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at
431−32.
23. Id.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25. See id. art. II, § 2.
26. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1−18.
27. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.

KITROSSER_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

“MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE

1169

does so within a policy framework created through the protective, dialogic and transparent realm of legislative process.29
The concern to balance liberty against energy and efficiency is
reflected more broadly throughout the complementary legislative and executive powers accorded respectively by Articles I
and II. This includes, of course, Congress’s ability to regulate
matters including foreign and interstate commerce,30 and its
ability to legislate on that which is “necessary and proper” to
effectuating its enumerated powers and those of the executive
and judicial branches.31 The resulting legislation constitutes
the statutory law that the executive is to execute.32
One complication that demonstrates the general nature of
the legislature/executive relationship and its intended protectiveness is the problem of delegation. Delegation, or the nondelegation doctrine, raises the question of just how broad
“macro-policy” can be before it ceases to give the executive the
mere power to execute its terms and instead delegates legislative power.33 Today, the non-delegation doctrine lacks much
doctrinal bite, although it has influence as a “shadow” doctrine.34 The very need for such a doctrine demonstrates the
practical complications in demanding that the executive refrain
from legislating.35 Nonetheless, the doctrine’s existence and its
acknowledged purpose reflect the intended nature of the legislature/executive relationship and the goals underlying such intent. Furthermore, the ability of the legislature to craft both
very broad and very narrow legislation is a virtue in a substantial sense. Such ability reflects the tremendous flexibility of the
macro-policymaking, or legislative, process. The legislature can
accord the President tremendous discretion where that appears
necessary, including the discretion to carry out legislative directives in secret.36 But among the legislature’s tools to check
29. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1342 (Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, and Co. 1833).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
32. See id. art. II, § 3.
33. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371−72 (1989); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693−94 (1892).
34. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some
Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 442−43 (1989).
35. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
36. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 528−30 (discussing the legislature’s ability to prescribe the boundaries of presidential secrecy).
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the abuses of such discretion is the ability to pass narrower
statutory directives, whether in anticipation of or in response to
such abuse. Indeed, the practical reality that it is hard to police
non-delegation requirements and that broad legislative directives to the executive are common makes it all the more urgent
to restrain blatant executive disregard for those clear legislative limitations that do exist.
2. Military Activities
Two contrasting theories make the military context a particularly important one in which to examine the constitutional
dynamic between legislature and executive. This Article argues, on the one hand, that while the need and apparent intent
to provide for robust presidential micro-powers is particularly
acute in the military realm, so is the need and apparent intent
to provide robust legislative macro-constraints. On the other
hand, theories of unchecked presidential prerogative in wartime have been deeply influential within the Bush administration,37 and have gained some ground within the academy as
well.38 Given this background, it is particularly important to
outline the ways in which the Constitution demands checks
and balances in the realm of military affairs. It is worth reiterating the organizing principle of these checks and balances:
while the President seems indeed to have heightened micropowers in this realm, so does the legislature have enhanced
macro-powers. Combined, these features translate the complementary benefits of energy and liberty to the realm of military
action.
Military checks and balances are apparent in the text and
structure of Articles I and II of the Constitution. Textually, the
President’s heightened micro-powers are embodied by his twin
directives to execute the law, including military related legislation, and to serve as commander in chief of the armed forces.39
Structurally, the qualities of the presidential office equip the

37. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESI59−67 (2004); Linda Greenhouse, Detention Cases Before Supreme
Court Will Test Limits of Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at
A20; Mayer, supra note 16, at 44−55; Rosen, supra note 16, at 8−10.
38. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National
Security: Hamdan and Beyond 3 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 134, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=922406 (citing such
theories within academia).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. § 3.
DENCY
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President to quickly execute defensive and offensive actions.40
This fact, combined with the textual provisions cited above and
the more general provision vesting “the executive Power”41 in
the President, suggest robust presidential duties and prerogatives in the realm of military activity. Yet the analysis cannot
stop there. Article I makes clear that the President is not unchecked within this realm.42 While his powers may be more robust within this realm, so too are the powers accorded the legislature to create and control the macro-framework within which
the President operates. Among Congress’s military powers are
its powers to declare war,43 to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”44 “to raise and support Armies,”45
“to provide and maintain a Navy,”46 “to make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,”47 “to
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,”48 and to
“provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the United States.”49
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently relied on Congress’s
copious checking functions over presidential wartime power in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, where a majority of the Court concluded
that the President lacked the power to employ executivecreated military commissions.50 The conclusion was based
partly on the view that Congress had directed the use of other
adjudicative forums under circumstances like those at issue.51
A concurrence by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter and Ginsburg, summed up that conclusion’s grounding
in constitutional checks and balances: “The Court’s conclusion
ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued
the Executive a ‘blank check’ . . . Where, as here, no emergency
prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra notes 19−20 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15−16.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756−57 (2006).
See id. at 2759, 2772−75, 2786−96.

KITROSSER_4FMT

1172

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1163

that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal
with danger.”52
Justice Breyer’s suggestion that only an emergency might
justify the circumvention of a statutory mandate is echoed by
the majority at points.53 This proposition reflects yet another
more complicated aspect of the macro-/micro-relationship between legislature and executive. Because only the executive is
structurally equipped to respond to immediate, unanticipated
threats,54 it stands to reason that the executive and commander-in-chief roles include the power to respond to such
threats absent, or in rare cases contrary to, statutory authority.
Such rare circumstances are those in which the legislative
process cannot be activated in time to respond to a major, imminent threat and in which the executive’s vigor and dispatch
therefore must fill the power void.55 The key here, however, is
to understand how crucial it is that such responses be rare and
temporally limited to what the immediate emergency requires.56 Once the immediate emergency passes, the transparency, dialogue and other protections of the legislative process
must be invoked to legitimize any continuing activities that fall
outside existing statutory mandates.57 This enables the executive to properly maintain its micro-execution role. It may step
in to fill temporary power voids necessary to preserve the
status quo when emergencies present themselves. However,
should it go beyond these restrictions to secretly run programs
that fall outside of these situational and temporal limitations
52. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
53. See id. at 2773−74; cf. id. at 2790 (“[A]ny departure must be tailored
to the exigency that necessitates it.”).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1−3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 424 (referring to single-headed presidency’s
unique capacity for “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”).
55. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[I]n a moment of genuine emergency, when
the Government must act with no time for deliberation, the Executive may be
able to detain a citizen if there is reason to fear he is an imminent threat to
the safety of the Nation and its people . . . .”).
56. Cf. id. (“[A]n emergency power of necessity must at least be limited by
the emergency.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
646−47 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the danger and historical
abuse of the concept of emergency powers).
57. Cf. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46
DUKE L.J. 679, 774−77 (1997) (making the interesting argument that the
Youngstown Court should have positively valued the fact that the President,
shortly after ordering seizure of the steel mills, invited Congress’s public approval or disapproval of his action).
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and outside existing statutory authorizations, it crosses a line
to usurp legislative powers. More importantly, it threatens the
liberty that such a line is meant to protect.
This reading of the situationally and temporally limited
realm in which executive power may transcend statutory limitations parallels the historical understanding that the President, while dependent on Congress to declare war, nonetheless
has the power to repel sudden attacks.58 Indeed, the Constitution’s drafters altered Congress’s Article I war power from the
power to “make war” to “the power to declare war” after it was
urged that the President have the power to repel sudden attacks.59 At the same time, it was argued in both the drafting
and ratification processes that, beyond such temporally limited
emergencies, the President must and would remain subject to
any congressional restraints.60
Finally, while it has been argued that the President unilaterally may engage in hostilities greater than the repelling of
sudden attacks,61 even such arguments accept a framework of
legislative control over any presidentially initiated actions, including Congress’s ability to stop such hostilities entirely by
withholding funding.62 Taken on their own terms, then, such
arguments assume public and congressional knowledge and ultimate control of hostilities. Thus, even from the vantage point
of such arguments, the President fills a micro-role in plugging
temporarily and situationally limited gaps that are checkable
by Congress when time and circumstances make such checking
feasible.
B. THE LEGISLATURE, THE PRESIDENT, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
RELATIONSHIPS TO INFORMATION CONTROL
The general relationship between the macro-policymaking
legislature and the micro-implementing executive, then, reflects a desire to balance needs for liberty and wisdom against
needs for energy and efficiency. An important subset of this relationship is the relationship between legislature and executive
with respect to information control. The legislative process is
designed largely as a transparent one to protect the people
58. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 8 (2d ed., rev. 2004);
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 96−100 (2005).
59. See FISHER, supra note 58, at 8; YOO, supra note 58, at 96−100.
60. See FISHER, supra note 58, at 8−10.
61. See YOO, supra note 58, at 96−100, 104−05.
62. See id. at 22, 139−42.
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against the tyrannical potential of secret government.63 The
presidential office, on the other hand, is designed in significant
part to facilitate presidential secrecy.64 The Constitution thus
embodies a “macro-transparency” directive insofar as it generally requires transparency in the macro-policymaking, or legislative process. Accompanying this directive is an allowance of
“micro-secrecy,” permitting presidential implementation sometimes to occur in secret. The justifications for this relationship
also are a subset of the justifications for the general macro/micro-relationship between legislature and executive. The secret implementation of macro-policy directives by the executive
can have obvious benefits for national security and for energy
and efficiency more generally. Yet the openness of the process
through which the governing macro-directives are formulated
guards against the threats to liberty and wisdom that secrecy
breeds.
This conclusion follows logically when one juxtaposes the
relatively transparent nature of the legislative process and the
President’s structural capacity for secrecy against the macro/micro-relationship between legislature and executive generally. As for the generally transparent nature of the legislative
process, I have catalogued elsewhere the various elements of
inter-branch and intra-branch dialogue and transparency of the
process, citing “a general expectation of deliberation and relative openness in the proceedings of the House and the Senate.”65 This expectation is exemplified partly by the requirement in Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 that “[e]ach House shall
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same.”66 Although the clause allows Congress to exempt “such [p]arts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy,”67 this allowance notably is framed as an exception to a
general openness norm. This fact, combined with the manymembered and dialogic nature of the legislature indicates an
expectation that instances of legislative secrecy will be rare and
will be sufficiently well known as to generate internal and external pressures in response to them.68 The general expectation
of congressional openness is bolstered also by historical expec63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See infra notes 65−71 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 72.
Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 518.
Id. at 521 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3).
Id.
See id. at 522−24.
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tations that congressional proceedings would be open and that
the secrecy allowance would be applied very narrowly.69 The
constitutional protection of legislators against punishment for
“Speech or Debate” also highlights the intrinsically dialogic legislative process that occurs within this presumptively public
setting and the importance placed on such dialogue.70 And Article I, Section 7 outlines the open, dialogic process of legislating:
the Constitution requires that a majority of the House of Representatives and of the Senate approve a bill. . . . Furthermore, once each
chamber approves a bill, the bill must be shared with the President
who concurs and signs the legislation or who, if he disagrees, not only
must return the legislation to the chamber in which it originated but
must do so “with his Objections.” The relationship of this requirement
to the process’ public nature is particularly clear in light of the mandate that the relevant chamber “enter the Objections at large on their
Journal.” Furthermore, the President’s objections ultimately must be
shared with both congressional chambers and the bill becomes law
only if two-thirds of each chamber, again against a presumptive
backdrop of dialogue and relative openness, approves it. In a final nod
to the process’ public nature, “the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively.”71

In contrast to the presumptively transparent legislative
process, the presidency is designed in significant part to facilitate secret activity. As a structural matter, this is apparent
from the fact that the President consists of a single person, who
naturally is better equipped to keep a secret than a large group
of people. This also is apparent structurally from the relative
dearth of formal constitutional requirements as to how the
President is to go about executing the law or serving as commander in chief. And history supports the notion that a major
advantage of the single-headed presidency was understood to
be the President’s ability to operate in secret.72
It follows logically that a major advantage sought by the
macro-/micro-relationship between legislature and executive is
a balanced approach to information control. The executive exists as a weapon that can be unleashed to engage in secret ac69. See id. at 520−27.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 35–37 (1948) (discussing the
significance of the Speech and Debate Clause).
71. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 518−19 (citations omitted). For more discussion of the open and dialogic nature of the legislative process, see
Fitzgerald, supra note 57, at 761−67.
72. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 524−26.
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tivity. Yet the macro-transparency of the legislative process
that fuels and checks the President’s micro-activities helps prevent presidential secrecy from turning against the people.
History supports this reading of Articles I and II. Indeed,
in looking to founding era statements, it is striking to see how
arguments about the information control advantages of the legislature/executive relationship parallel arguments about the
general advantages of that relationship. In Federalist 26, for
example, Alexander Hamilton spoke against objections to the
government’s power to provide for an army.73 Hamilton explained that the lodging of this power in the legislative process
and the limitation on the legislature’s authorizing funds for
more than two years at a time alleviate most of the cited dangers.74 Hamilton drew partly on the general protections of the
legislative process, particularly insofar as legislators “are not at
liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for
the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to
be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.”75 Hamilton
especially emphasized the protections of the legislature’s dialogic, transparent features and of these features coming into
play every two years with respect to military authorizations.76
He noted that the legislature must, every two years, “deliberate” about military funds and “declare their sense of the matter
by a formal vote in the face of their constituents.”77 “As often as
the question comes forward,” he argued, “the public attention
will be roused . . . by the party in opposition; and if the majority
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it.”78
Alexander Hamilton also juxtaposed the advantages of
presidential secrecy with the checking and sunlight-shedding
role of the Congress.79 It is important to recognize this feature
of Hamilton’s ratification era arguments. Hamilton’s extolling
of a single President’s capacity for secrecy80 often is cited to
73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (James Madison), supra note 21, at 171.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 172.
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at
423−25.
80. See id.
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support a broad presidential discretion to keep secrets.81 Yet a
careful reading of Hamilton’s pre ratification statements reveals an emphasis on balancing executive secrecy, vigor and efficiency against tools for shedding light on and checking executive abuses.82 For example, in the same Federalist Paper in
which Hamilton concludes that legislative checking adds
“safety” to executive “energy,” he discusses the light-generating
impact of the Senate’s role in the nomination process.83 Echoing
Madison’s arguments about the transparency of legislative
military appropriations,84 Hamilton explains: “[A]s there would
be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment
of an entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment . . . would naturally become matters of notoriety, and the public would be at no loss to determine what
part had been performed by the different actors.”85 Both Hamilton and John Jay make similar points about the Senate’s role
in the treaty process. It is in the context of discussing treaties
that Jay, like Hamilton, famously touts secrecy as a virtue of
the single-headed Presidency. Like Hamilton, however, Jay
combines this point with the benefits of a single President’s ultimate transparency for legislative and popular checking
agents. As I have noted elsewhere:
After referring approvingly to the President’s capacity for secrecy in
the treaty negotiation context, Jay dismisses concerns about corruption, deeming it improbable “that the President and two thirds of the
Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct.” Jay further
reassures that “in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so
obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null
and void by the law of nations.” Finally, should all other safeguards
fail, Jay explains that “motive to good behavior is amply afforded by
the article on the subject of impeachments.” Jay’s references to Senatorial, bi-cameral (through impeachment) and international oversight
assume a capacity on the part of those with oversight power to uncover information relating to possible Presidential corruption in the
treaty-making process. Furthermore, insofar as Jay connects Senatorial and Presidential incentives for good behavior with the possibility
of public rebuke, citing concerns about “honor,” “reputations” and
“disgrace,” Jay assumes that an investigating and punishing Congress can make damaging information public and that this possibility

81. See, e.g., MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 24−25 (2002).
82. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 506, 511 (explaining this reading of
Federalist No. 70).
83. See supra notes 22−23 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 75−78 and accompanying text.
85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 21, at 461.
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will incentivize good behavior. This is consistent with [an observation
by Alexander Hamilton] . . . that the Senate will not hesitate to shift
public blame to the President for problems in the making of treaties.86

C. THE MACRO-TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE AND JUSTICE
JACKSON’S POWER ZONES
This Subpart connects the theoretical principles of Subparts A and B to Justice Jackson’s well-known analysis from
his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.87
This Subpart does so for two reasons. First, the three power
zones named by Justice Jackson88 constitute useful shorthand
to describe the events that will be discussed in Part II. Second,
the Jackson analysis is one of the most well-known tools for
conceptualizing the relationship between presidential power
and congressional power.89 Indeed, this analysis has been cited
often by participants and commentators in the recent surveillance controversies.90 Yet as with separation of powers analysis
generally, the relationship between this analysis and information control rarely is explored. The relationship of separated
powers with information control and with the NSA controversies thus may be better understood if the discussion in Subparts A and B is translated into the language of the Jackson
analysis.
In Youngstown, Justice Jackson described three basic
zones of presidential power.91 Presidential power is “at its
maximum” in zone one.92 In this first zone, “the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”93
In zone two, presidential power is at an uncertain, intermediate level.94 In this second zone, “the President acts in absence
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”95 Here,
the President:
86. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 525−26 (citations omitted).
87. 343 U.S. 579, 634−38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 635−38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing three major zones
in which presidential power can operate).
89. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); FISHER, supra note 58, at 116−17.
90. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11, 19−20, 28; Bazan & Elsea,
supra note 2, at 5−6.
91. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635−38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 635.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 637.
95. Id.

KITROSSER_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

“MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE

1179

can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.96

In zone three the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb.”97
In this third zone, he “takes measures incompatible with the
express or implied will of Congress.”98 He thus “can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.”99
The first zone is the simplest from the perspective of the
macro-transparency directive. The President’s authority is at
his highest in this zone because his actions are legitimized by
statutory authority, which itself is legitimized partly by the
relative transparency of the legislative process. Hence, even
where micro-secrecy characterizes aspects of the President’s
implementation, the macro-framework under which he operates itself is transparent. The second zone raises the possibility
of inherent presidential powers or presidential powers pursuant to very broad, ambiguous statutory authority, while the
third zone raises the possibility of presidential powers that are
both inherent and that trump contrary statutory authority. Actions in the respective zones indeed have progressively less
presumptive legitimacy. The absence of a relatively clear, authorizing statutory process means the absence of legislative
macro-transparency. And in the third zone, not only is such
process absent but in its place is a macro-transparent process
offering false assurance to the public and to other branches
that the relevant activity will not take place. As suggested in
Part B, however, there are three major points of flexibility by
which zone two and even zone three actions sometimes are legitimate. First, inherent powers may be activated in a true
emergency, although such power must be very carefully constrained if it is not to swallow the rules of checks and balances.100 Indeed, if such power is restrained so that regular political processes are activated as soon as possible, then the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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macro-/micro-framework is never truly violated.101 Rather, the
executive remains in a micro/implementation role insofar as he
acts unilaterally only to fill a temporary, emergency gap in government infrastructure. Second, the possibility and frequency
of broad legislation leaves substantial room for executive discretion and for secrecy in the use of such discretion.102 Technically, such actions could be said to occur within zone one but
the line between zones one and two is fine where statutory authority is broad or ambiguous.103 Again, given the dangers
posed by executive discretion and secrecy, it is crucial that the
executive branch adhere to any clear legislative limitations and
to legislative oversight. The legislature’s macro-framework and
its transparency thus continue to perform at least a shadow
role, facilitating the exposure of executive branch activity or
placing other checks on the executive branch. Third, there may
be other inherent powers that can be invoked without, or in
rare instances contrary to, statutory authorization, at least
where a situation that might itself be activated by legislation
justifies such power.104 For example, where Congress authorizes the use of military force, presidential powers to execute
that authorization and to command the military may encompass a range of implementation activities not contemplated by
the authorization’s language or history. Such a situation is very
similar to, and may overlap with, the second point of flexibility
just noted and hence with both zones one and two. And such
situations could fall within zone three as well. The latter may
occur, for example, where inherent powers are activated by a
use of force authorization but where more specific statutes limit
activities that otherwise would fall within such powers. Zone
three actions are particularly dangerous because they not only
lack a macro-transparent authorization but they occur in the
wake of macro-transparent authorization falsely assuring the
people and other branches that the relevant actions will not occur. This is a major reason for the strong presumptive illegitimacy of zone three actions. Legislative oversight serves a particularly important function in these cases, helping to

101. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
102. For discussion of the non-delegation doctrine, see supra notes 33−35
and accompanying text.
103. See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 4 (discussing the statutory interpretation problem posed but unanswered by the Jacksonian power zones).
104. See supra notes 55−56 and accompanying text.
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determine whether laws have been violated and if so what consequences should follow.
II. NSA SURVEILLANCE BEFORE 9/11 AND THE MACROTRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE
Past and present NSA surveillance controversies are
uniquely apt subjects to view through the lens of the preceding
analysis. The very topic of surveillance raises the tension between the need for government secrecy, as surveillance by its
nature must be conducted covertly, and the dangers of government secrecy, as covert surveillance is rife with the potential
for abuse. The history that led to FISA demonstrates both the
executive branch’s capacity for secrecy and efficacy and the risk
that this capacity will be used tyrannically. As Senator Frank
Church warned at Senate hearings to investigate intelligence
gathering abuses (“The Church Hearings”), “[t]he danger lies in
the ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against
domestic communications . . . . [T]he NSA could be turned inward and used against our own people.”105
This Part discusses some of the history leading to FISA as
well as aspects of FISA and related legislation. This history and
resulting legislation have much to tell us about the constitutional principles described in Part I. And new light can be shed
on the history and legislation themselves by viewing them
through the lens of these constitutional principles.
A. FISA AND THE HEARINGS AND EVENTS THAT PRECEDED IT
In the mid-1970s, a Senate Committee—often called the
“Church Committee” for its chairman Frank Church—was
charged to “conduct an investigation and study of governmental
operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities
were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.”106
This Subpart provides some background on the Committee’s
findings as to the behavior engaged in by the intelligence agen105. 5 Hearings Before S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities: National Sec. Agency and Fourth
Amendment Rights, 94th Cong. 2−3 (1976) [hereinafter Church NSA Hearings].
106. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975), quoted in FINAL REPORT OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: BOOK II, at v (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
REPORT].
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cies generally and the NSA in particular. It also discusses the
oversight process of the hearings and some of the hearings’ major legislative fruits, including FISA. Finally, the Subpart explores the relationship between these events and the macrotransparency directive.107
1. Intelligence Agency Behavior
The Church Committee’s work focused predominantly on
five agencies: the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than the
NSA) and the National Security Council and its component
parts.108 The Committee found that the agencies had engaged
in decades-long secret monitoring of American citizens.109 Such
monitoring took various forms, ranging from the opening of
first class mail, to electronic surveillance and even to infiltration of groups.110 Agency monitoring was dramatically overbroad, reaching thousands of American citizens and often triggered by citizens’ associations with civil rights groups, peace
organizations or other advocacy groups.111 The Committee
deemed such overbreadth a natural outgrowth of intelligence
activities’ “tendency . . . to expand beyond their initial scope,”112
a tendency that “runs through every aspect of [the Committee’s] investigative findings.”113 The Committee thus identified
“a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited
goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as
‘vacuum cleaners,’ sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.”114 The Committee was careful to emphasize that its findings “cannot [be] dismiss[ed] . . . as isolated

107. A House Committee chaired by Otis Pike and a presidential commission chaired by Nelson Rockefeller engaged in similar studies around the same
time. See DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE
OVERSIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN 9 (June
2006) [hereinafter CAP REPORT]. The Church Committee’s reports are widely
considered the most comprehensive and influential of the studies. For simplicity’s sake, this Article focuses on the Church Committee’s hearings and findings.
108. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at vii.
109. See id. at 5−10.
110. See id. at 5.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3−4.
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acts.”115 Rather, the cited behaviors “have occurred repeatedly
throughout administrations of both political parties going back
four decades.”116
The Committee’s findings about the NSA exemplify these
broader patterns. The NSA was created in 1952 by Executive
Order “to conduct ‘signals intelligence,’ including the interception and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic
means.”117 The NSA Director testified that the agency’s mission
“is directed to foreign intelligence obtained from foreign electrical communications”118 and that the NSA interprets “‘foreign
communications’ to include communication where one terminal
is outside the United States.”119 Despite the agency’s internal
limitation against purely domestic surveillance, the Committee
found that the “distinction between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ intelligence” clearly eroded over time in the NSA’s operations.120
From 1964 to1976, for example, the NSA “monitored international communications of Americans involved in domestic dissent.”121 Like the FBI, the CIA and military intelligence agencies, the NSA was assigned to investigate “‘racial matters,’ the
‘New Left,’ ‘student agitation,’ and alleged ‘foreign influence’ on
the antiwar movement.”122 While citing the intelligence community’s general tendencies toward abuse and overreaching,
the Church Committee expressed special concerns about these
tendencies in conjunction with the NSA’s vast technological capacity.123
2. Factors Facilitating the Behavior
How and why could such widespread abuses have occurred
for so long? The Church Committee’s primary answer was that
the “checks and balances designed by the Framers of the Constitution to assure accountability have not been applied.”124

115. Id. at 289.
116. Id. at vii, 289.
117. Id. at 104.
118. Id. (quoting Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 6).
119. Id. at vii; see also Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 24−25.
120. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 104.
121. Id. at 69.
122. Id. at 70; see also id. at 96.
123. See supra text accompanying note 105; see also CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 36−38.
124. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 289.
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Some important elements of this conclusion include the following:
1. Human beings naturally abuse power.125 A major manifestation of this fact is the tendency of government officials to
stretch dramatically the concept of “national security” to justify
intrusive government operations.126 The Constitution’s Framers established checks against such natural tendencies, recognizing that we must oblige government not only to “control the
governed,” but to “control itself.”127 Those checks for years have
been ignored in the context of intelligence operations.128
2. The Constitution’s checks and balances were ignored
most blatantly and systematically in Congress’s failure to provide a detailed, comprehensive statutory framework governing
foreign intelligence activity.129
3. Statutory checks that did exist were bypassed by the intelligence agencies.130
4. The relevant operations were held in vast secrecy within
the intelligence community.131 In some instances, secrets even
were kept from higher-ups in the executive branch, and secrecy
from Congress and from the public was the operative norm.132
Secrecy amounted not only to omission, but often to downright
deception.133 The Commission effectively drew a distinction between macro-secrecy and micro-secrecy, deeming it very troubling that intelligence agencies resorted to the former.134 To
this effect, the Committee stated, “Abuse thrives on secrecy.
Obviously, public disclosure of matters such as the names of intelligence agents or the technological details of collection methods is inappropriate. But in the field of intelligence, secrecy has
125. See, e.g., id. at 291, 293 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison)).
126. See id. at 3−4, 104, 205, 289.
127. Id. at 293 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)); see
also id. at iii (“[O]ur experience as a nation has taught us that we must place
our trust in laws, not solely in men.”).
128. Id. at iii, 289−90.
129. Id. at 165, 169−70; see id. at 186−87, 308; see also Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 35−36, 38, 42, 62−63 (exploring the lack of guidance of
and restrictions on intelligence-gathering activities).
130. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 139, 190; see also Church NSA
Hearings, supra note 105, at 57−59 (detailing the legal and constitutional
problems with the NSA’s SHAMROCK message-collection program).
131. CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 146, 292.
132. Id. at 146, 152, 292.
133. Id. at 16−17, 146.
134. See id. at 292.
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been extended to inhibit review of the basic programs and practices themselves.”135
5. Congress failed to provide effective oversight, bolstering
the intelligence community’s ability to shield other branches
and the public from knowledge as to the basic nature and existence of programs.136
6. The foregoing factors—the absence of much governing
legislation, violations of existing legislation, secrecy, and lack of
oversight—stemmed partly from the pervasive view on the part
of the governing branches and the public “that the control of intelligence activities [is] the exclusive prerogative of the Chief
Executive and his surrogates.”137
3. Information Disclosure During the Hearings
A major means through which the legislature can provide
transparency is through oversight, particularly hearings in
which executive branch testimony and documents are sought.
As Woodrow Wilson observed, Congress’s “informing function”
may be more important than its legislative function.138 The Supreme Court, citing Wilson’s point, noted Congress’s power “to
inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government.”139 In this realm, too,
the choice need not be between complete secrecy and complete
openness. That is, withholding information from Congress entirely is not the only alternative to full public disclosure.
Rather, the Constitution again provides for macro-frameworks
through which Congress can formulate processes to decide
when and how to request, receive and publicize executive
branch information. One such macro-framework is the legislative process.140 Congress can pass and has passed statutes empowering it or others to receive information from the executive
branch.141 These statutes often impose procedural restrictions
on the means through or extent to which information can be ob-

135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 6, 14−15; see id. at 290.
137. Id. at 292.
138. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (quoting
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (New York, Houghton
Mifflin 1885)).
139. Id.
140. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
141. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 496−500.
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tained.142 One statute, for example, requires a legislative chamber to vote before a contempt charge can be brought against an
uncooperative witness.143 A second macro-framework is the
rulemaking process of each congressional chamber. The Constitution leaves it to “Each House [to] determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.”144 This encompasses rules on informationgathering.145
The Church hearings themselves were, of course, a form of
oversight. A few aspects of the hearings stand out in this respect. First, the Committee was quite successful in accessing
national security information of a scope and nature that past
Congresses had not sought or obtained.146 Indeed, historian
Loch K. Johnson has labeled the era from 1947, when the National Security Act was passed and the intelligence community
was formally established,147 until 1974 the “Era of Trust.”148
Johnson relays an anecdote to illustrate the state of oversight
in the Era of Trust: “then-CIA Director James Schlesinger recalled . . . Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John
Stennis (D-Miss.) telling him in 1973, ‘Just go ahead and do it,
but I don’t want to know!’”149 By the Church Committee’s formation in 1974, Congress was stunned and then emboldened
after learning, “primarily from press accounts,” “of a series of
botched and ill-advised covert actions at home and abroad.”150
This set the stage for the Committee’s substantial mandate151
and for an atmosphere in which it had the political capital to

142. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2000).
143. Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 536 n.218 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
145. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROTECTION
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 1−6
(2005) (discussing rules created and considered by each house with respect to
gathering and protecting classified information).
146. See, e.g., Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 1−3, 41, 62 (comparing the NSA information sought and obtained by the Church Committee to
that sought and obtained in earlier Congresses); see also CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 6, 152 (noting the past concealment of information from Congress).
147. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 6.
148. Id. at 9 (citing LOCH K. JOHNSON, GOVERNING IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANGELS: ON THE PRACTICE OF INTELLIGENCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (2003), http://www.dcaf.ch/legal_wg/ev_oslo_030919_ johnson.pdf ).
149. Id. at 9 (citing Johnson, supra note 148, at 13).
150. Id.
151. See supra text accompanying note 106.
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seek and obtain access to top levels of the intelligence community.152
The Church Committee had important decisions to make
not only as to the information that it should seek, but as to the
information that it should make public. In some cases, the
Committee met privately to determine whether to hold certain
hearings or discuss certain information in public.153 The Committee decided, for example, to take the public testimony of
NSA officials for the first time in history.154 Chairman Church
noted the following at the start of that hearing:
The Committee has elected to hold public hearings on the NSA
only after the most careful consideration . . . . To make sure this
committee does not interfere with ongoing intelligence activities, we
have had to be exceedingly careful, for the techniques of the NSA are
of the most sensitive and fragile character. We have prepared ourselves exhaustively; we have circumscribed the area of inquiry to include only those which represent abuses of power; and we have
planned the format for today’s hearings with great care, so as not to
venture beyond our stated objectives.
....
Our staff has conducted an intensive 5-month investigation of
NSA, and has been provided access to required Agency files and personnel. NSA has been cooperative with the committee, and a relationship of mutual trust has been developed. Committee members have
received several briefings in executive session on the activities of the
Agency, including a week of testimony from the most knowledgeable
individuals, in an effort to determine what might be made public
without damaging its effectiveness. Among others, we have met with
the Directors of the NSA and the CIA, as well as the Secretary of Defense. Finally, once the decision was made to hold public hearings on
the NSA, the committee worked diligently with the Agency to draw
legitimate boundaries for the public discussion that would preserve

152. See supra note 146 (citing references in the Church NSA Hearings and
in the Church Report regarding relatively meager access by past Congresses to
information obtained by the Church Committee); see also, e.g., Anthony Lewis,
Executive Privilege May Be an Issue Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1975, at 184
(“Political will is inevitably related to public opinion, and there the omens
rather point toward revived Congressional firmness. Vietnam and Watergate
drastically reduced public belief in the reasons given for executive secrecy.”).
But see Nicholas M. Horrock, How Deeply Should the C.I.A. Be Looked Into?,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1975, at 182 (“A substantial portion of the public believes
that too much information on the [CIA] has already come out. These critics say
that every new publicized detail serves to weaken national security and unnecessarily expose intelligence operations to foreign governments.”).
153. See, e.g., Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 1−3, 5, 46−50,
51−52, 57−58.
154. See id. at 1.
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the technical secrets of NSA, and also allow a thorough airing of
Agency practices affecting American citizens.
In short, the committee has proceeded cautiously. We are keenly
aware of the sensitivity of the NSA, and wish to maintain its important role in our defense system. Still, we recognize our responsibility
to the American people to conduct a thorough and objective investigation of each of the intelligence services. We would be derelict in our
duties if we were to exempt NSA from public accountability.155

The existence of intra-Committee debate on the matter of
publicity was clear. Committee members Senators Tower and
Goldwater dissented openly to the hearings’ public nature.156
Senator Hart indicated that he originally had been opposed to
public hearings but that he had changed his position in light of
the information gleaned by the Committee about NSA abuses
and about the hiding of those abuses from Congress and the
public “for nearly [thirty] years.”157
4. The Hearings’ Legislative Fruits
a. FISA
A major fruit of the hearings was the eventual passage of
FISA.158 This Subsection notes some major aspects of FISA that
relate to electronic surveillance.159
First, FISA’s drafters sought to establish clear, publicly
known directives for foreign intelligence gathering. Among
other things, FISA governs electronic surveillance of communications to or from a U.S. citizen or legal alien who is in the
United States.160 It also governs electronic surveillance of communications “to or from any person . . . within the United
States without the consent of at least one party” to the commu-

155. Id. at 1−2.
156. See id. at 38, 39, 41, 50, 61, 63.
157. Id. at 62.
158. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 42; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at 12.
159. FISA’s provisions govern “electronic surveillance, physical searches,
installation and use pen registers/trap and trace devices, and orders to disclose tangible items.” 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801−61 (2000); GINA STEVENS & CHARLES
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING, at 37
(2003).
160. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f )(1) (2000) (providing that electronic surveillance includes communications sent or intended to be received by a “known
United States person who is in the United States”); 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2000)
(defining “United States person” to include U.S. citizens and legal aliens).
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nication.161 FISA requires, with a few exceptions,162 that such
surveillance be conducted pursuant to a warrant.163 Warrant
requests, which must be authorized by the Attorney General,
are made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.164 The
Court is “comprised of eleven federal court judges designated
by the Chief Justice to sit on the Court for a single seven year
term.”165 Among other things, the application must specify why
the person targeted for surveillance “is believed to be a foreign
power or the agent of a foreign power,”166 a category that includes those “engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor[e].”167 The application also must summarize the procedures that will be followed to minimize the acquisition and use of information concerning United States citizens
or legal aliens.168 Additionally, the application must include
certification by a senior advisor to the President that “a significant purpose of interception is to secure foreign intelligence information”169 and that the information cannot reasonably be
obtained through other means.170 The application process is
conducted in a highly secretive manner.171 FISA court judges
issue ex parte warrants for surveillance “upon a finding that
the application requirements have been met and that there is
probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or
the agent of a foreign power.”172
Second, FISA provides for two emergency exceptions to the
warrant requirement for electronic surveillance.173 First, the
161. Bazan & Elsea, supra note 2, at 21 (emphasis added) (citing 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(f )(2) (2000) (explaining that electronic surveillance includes communications sent or received by “a person in the United States, without the consent
of any party thereto”)).
162. See infra notes 173−77 and accompanying text.
163. See RISEN, supra note 1, at 42; STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 159, at
37.
164. STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 159, at 55.
165. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)−(b), (d) (2000)).
166. Id. at 56.
167. Id. at 56 n.144 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)−(b) (2000)).
168. Id. at 57 & n.145.
169. Id. at 58 & n.146 (explaining that the Patriot Act altered the requirement from certification that foreign intelligence gathering is “the purpose” of
interception to certification that foreign intelligence gathering is “a significant
purpose” of interception).
170. Id. at 58.
171. Id. at 54.
172. Id. at 58 & n.148 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000)).
173. FISA also provides a third exception that is less relevant for the pur-
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Attorney General is authorized to permit electronic surveillance prior to obtaining a warrant “if the Attorney General determines that emergency conditions make it impossible to obtain [a warrant] with due diligence before the surveillance is
begun.”174 In such cases, “[t]he Attorney General or his designee must immediately inform a FISA judge and submit a
proper application to that judge as soon as practicable, but not
more than 72 hours” after the surveillance is authorized.175 As
with FISA surveillance generally, procedures to minimize the
acquisition and use of information concerning United States
citizens or legal aliens must be followed.176 A second exception
permits the Attorney General “to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order for fifteen calendar days following a
declaration of war by Congress.”177
Third, it is noteworthy that FISA has been amended explicitly on many occasions,178 including through the USA Patriot
Act of 2001179 and through seven other amending acts passed
after September 11, 2001.180 Among other things, the Patriot
Act authorized the use of “[r]oving wiretaps” under FISA,181 increased the permitted duration of FISA wiretaps,182 increased
the number of FISA court judges from seven to eleven,183 and
authorized surveillance under FISA where foreign intelligence

poses of this Article. That exception “permits the Attorney General to acquire
foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year if the Attorney
General certifies in writing under oath that the electronic surveillance is
solely directed at . . . foreign powers or on property or premises under the open
and exclusive control of a foreign power [not including international terrorist
organizations] where ‘there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance
will acquire’” communications involving U.S. citizens or legal aliens. Bazan &
Elsea, supra note 2, at 25−26 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2000)).
174. Id. at 26 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f ) (2000)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).
178. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) (2006) [hereinafter FISA AMENDMENTS REPORT] (listing amendments since 1994).
179. See id. at 11−18 (listing changes made to FISA by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001)).
180. Id. at 8−29.
181. Id. at 11 (citing Patriot Act § 206).
182. Id. at 11−12 (citing Patriot Act § 207).
183. Id. at 12 (citing Patriot Act § 208).
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gathering is a “significant purpose,” as opposed to the sole purpose, of surveillance.184
b. Congressional Oversight Rules
As reflected in the Church Committee’s conclusions,185 the
Committee’s hearings and related revelations of the era “convinced many Senators and Representatives that Congress had
been too lax in carrying out its oversight responsibilities.”186
With this realization came the end of Congress’s “era of
trust”187 and the promulgation of some provisions—including
statutes and internal congressional rules—to facilitate congressional oversight and information.188 Aspects of these provisions
have been supplemented and amended over the years.189 The
intelligence community’s current statutory disclosure responsibilities include:
1. The President is to keep the congressional intelligence
committees “‘fully and currently informed’ of U.S. intelligence
activities, including any ‘significant anticipated intelligence activity.’”190
2. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the intelligence agency heads similarly must “‘keep the intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities’. . .” including through written reports on “significant
anticipated intelligence activity.”191
3. In carrying out his or her informing duties, the DNI
must “show ‘due regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelli-

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 16 (citing Patriot Act § 218); see also supra note 169.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 11.
See supra text accompanying notes 148−49.
See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 11−12; L. BRITT SNIDER, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SHARING SECRETS WITH LAWMAKERS: CONGRESS AS A
USER OF INTELLIGENCE 6, 8 (1997).
189. See ALFRED CUMMING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH CONGRESS IS TO BE INFORMED OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING COVERT ACTIONS 2−6 (2006); SNIDER, supra note 188,
at 9−13.
190. CUMMING, supra note 189, at 2 (quoting Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
Pub. L. No. 663, § 15, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (amended 1956) and S. Rep. No 10285, at 32 (1991)).
191. Id. at 4 (quoting National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)
(1947)).
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gence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive
matters.’”192
4. The President may limit prior notice of actions to the
congressional group commonly known as the “Gang of Eight”—
meaning “the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate”193—under very limited circumstances. Specifically, the President may limit disclosure regarding covert actions where the President determines that
limited notice is “‘essential . . . to meet extraordinary circumstances. . .’ affecting U.S. vital interests.”194 “Covert action” is
distinct from “intelligence activit[y].”195 The former is defined
by statute to mean “‘an activity or activities of the United
States Government to influence political, economic, or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.’”196 There also is a “possibl[e]” exception for limiting notification to the “Gang of Eight” where “necessary to
protect intelligence sources and methods.”197
5. Macro-Transparency Based Reflections
The history and adoption of FISA and related oversight
measures do much to vindicate the perceptions and visions of
the Constitution’s Framers. The years of abuse that prompted
the Church hearings and FISA demonstrate the intuitive insight that human beings are no “angels,”198 that they have a
natural tendency to abuse power,199 and that this tendency can
flourish particularly well in an office equipped for secrecy and
vigor.200 Happily, however, the corrective potential of separated
192. Id.
193. CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 22.
194. CUMMING, supra note 189, at 5−6.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id. at 3 n.8 (quoting the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.
§ 413(b) (1947)).
197. Id. at 4.
198. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 21, at 322.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 70 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (citing the statements of James Wilson to suggest that the executive
should possess secrecy, vigor, and dispatch, and citing James Madison to say
that he agrees with Wilson but notes the risk of “elective Monarchies”); 2 id. at
81 (“[The executive] will be more open to caresses [and] intrigues than the

KITROSSER_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

“MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE

1193

powers and their relationship to information control was demonstrated by the eventual exposure of these abuses by the press
and by Congress’s responses. Among other things, Congress effectuated further information discovery and crafted legal curbs
on future abuses. Congress did this in a manner that took advantage of the virtues of both macro-transparency and microsecrecy: macro-transparency through the hearings and through
subsequent legislation, and micro-secrecy in the executive opacity provided for in FISA and in the oversight mechanisms by
which the Committee agreed to shield from the public some of
the information that it learned. The capturing of macrotransparency’s and micro-secrecy’s advantages is reflected also
in the fact that decisions to shield information apparently were
made after discussion and with public acknowledgment of the
same.
The following is a more detailed breakdown of the insights
about macro-transparency and micro-secrecy that can be
gleaned from the history and adoption of FISA and related
oversight measures:
1. The pre-FISA abuses demonstrate the importance of legislative macro-transparency that shapes executive activity. At
least some of the pre-FISA activity apparently occurred within
zone two or even zone one of Justice Jackson’s categories, given
the Church Committee’s observation about the absence of much
specific constraining legislation.201 This observation most intuitively leads, as the Committee concluded, to the view that clear,
macro-transparent legislative standards should be formulated
to constrain the executive, even if those standards themselves
leave room for executive micro-secrecy.202
2. The pre-FISA abuses also demonstrate the importance of
congressional oversight of ongoing executive activity. First,
oversight is necessary to ensure that existing statutory constraints are being followed and to facilitate the continued use of
the macro-transparent legislative process to make further
statutory changes as needed. Indeed, the Committee discovered
the violation of some existing statutory constraints, or, in Justice Jackson’s terms, zone three activity.203 Second, oversight is
necessary to review zone one and zone two activity. Even if no
legal violations exist, sufficient policy problems may exist in
Senate.”) (quoting Oliver Elseworth).
201. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.

KITROSSER_4FMT

1194

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1163

the execution of statutory directives to suggest the importance
of new measures. This may be particularly important with respect to very broad statutory directives. Third, oversight is necessary to discern the existence of possible constitutional violations, regardless of whether statutory violations exist. The
Committee repeatedly noted their concern that NSA activity
ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.204 The Committee also
cited the importance of transparency to create awareness of,
and the potential to redress, such violations.205
3. FISA exemplifies the ability of legislation to capture the
advantages of legislative macro-transparency and formality,
and executive branch micro-secrecy and discretion. For one
thing, FISA’s core warrant requirement itself combines transparent macro-directives with leeway for the executive to effectuate such directives in relative secrecy.206 FISA also seeks to
ensure enough regular information flow to Congress to enable
meaningful oversight without compromising the secrecy of individual warrant processes. FISA requires, for example, annual
reporting on the number of applications sought and granted.207
FISA’s emergency exceptions also seek to capture through statute the emergency response function of the executive valued in
constitutional history and structure.208 The limits on these
emergency exceptions, however, can help to prevent the filling
of emergency power gaps from morphing into regular, secret
rule by executive discretion.209
4. The separate statutory oversight measures enacted in
the wake of the scandals further exemplify tools to facilitate the
inter-branch information flow necessary to make the macrolegislative and micro-execution scheme workable.210 The ongoing informing responsibility imposed by these statutes211 on the
intelligence community is particularly important in that subset
of Jacksonian zone one where very broad legislative directives
exist, and in Jacksonian zone two, where no legislative direc204. See CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 14, 137, 139, 190−91, 290−91.
205. See supra notes 131−35 and accompanying text; see also Church NSA
Hearings, supra note 105, at 46−52; CHURCH REPORT, supra note 106, at 2−3.
206. See supra notes 163−72 and accompanying text.
207. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND RECENT JUDICIAL DECISION 32 (2005).
208. See supra notes 173−77 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 173−77 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 190−97 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 190−91 and accompanying text.
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tives exist. In such realms, Congress may not know which
questions to ask or which information to request to conduct effective oversight unless the executive branch regularly provides
Congress with basic information. And, the “Gang of Eight” provision cited earlier212 reflects the fact that Congress, through
legislation and through its constitutional ability to create intrachamber procedural rules, has countless mechanisms available
to it to strike a balance between complete secrecy and complete
openness. Limiting the “Gang of Eight” provision to only certain covert actions213 also indicates Congress’s awareness of the
potential abuse of exceptions to a general informing responsibility. Finally, as noted earlier, Congress has other, more general information-gathering statutes and intra-chamber rules at
its disposal.214 As the Church hearings reflect, for example,
Senate committees privately may discuss and vote on whether
to take testimony behind closed doors or whether to take it publicly, and the public may be made privy at least to the fact and
topic of this discussion.215
III. POST-9/11 DEVELOPMENTS:
LESSONS UNLEARNED AND POSSIBLY RELEARNED
A. THE NSA’S POST-9/11 ACTIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATION’S
RESPONSE TO THE LEAKED INFORMATION
In December of 2005, the New York Times broke the story
that the Bush administration, since shortly after 9/11, had secretly authorized the NSA to spy on telephone calls where one
party to the call was outside of the United States.216 Members
of the administration, including President Bush and Attorney
General Gonzales, have publicly confirmed the existence of the
program.217 Furthermore, the administration has defended the
212. See supra notes 193−97 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 141−45 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
216. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1; Sanger, supra note 1.
217. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d
754, 764−65 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“It is undisputed that [the] Defendants have
publicly admitted . . . [that] the [surveillance program] exists.”); Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal 2006) (discussing government
admissions and concluding that “the government has disclosed the general
contours of the ‘terrorist surveillance program’”); see also, e.g., DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 1; Sanger, supra note 1; Press Release, Press Briefing by
Attorney Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy
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program vigorously through public legal memoranda, in congressional hearings, and in the press.218 Despite its defenses,
which are discussed below, the administration has never seriously claimed that the program complies with FISA’s warrant
requirements. Indeed, the administration could not make this
argument in light of its admission that the program permits
warrantless telephone surveillance of U.S. citizens and legal
aliens so long as one party to the call is overseas. Such permission, of course, runs directly counter to FISA’s terms prohibiting warrantless surveillance of any call to which a U.S. citizen
or legal alien in the United States is a party. Nor is there any
claim that the NSA program falls under one of FISA’s emergency exceptions, as the program is not limited either to
seventy-two-hour intervals of warrantless spying or to a fifteenday period following a congressional declaration of war.219
The administration’s main legal defense comprises two arguments. First, the administration argues that it need not have
complied with FISA because FISA’s requirements were supplanted by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) enacted in the wake of the September 11th attacks.
Second, the administration argues that, even if the AUMF does
not directly authorize the NSA program, the Constitution inherently empowers the President to create such a program.
And while the administration often avoids saying it definitively, it repeatedly indicates that any legislation that conflicts
with such inherent power probably is unconstitutional.220
As for the first argument, the AUMF was enacted three
days after September 11, 2001. It authorized the President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.221
Dir. for Nat. Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Gonzales-Hayden
Briefing], http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html.
218. See, e.g., Wartime Executive Power and National Security Agency’s
Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11
(2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2006-hr/nsasurv.pdf [hereinafter
Gonzales Transcript]; DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4; Sanger, supra note 1;
Gonzales-Hayden Briefing, supra note 217.
219. See supra notes 176−77 and accompanying text (citing these statutory
exceptions).
220. See discussion infra Part III.B.
221. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001).
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The administration argues that this authorization encompasses the NSA surveillance program as necessary, incident to
determining who was involved in the attacks and to using force
against such persons.222 The administration further argues
that FISA’s language provides for supplementation by other
statutes by prohibiting “intentionally ‘engag[ing] . . . in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute.’”223 According to the administration, AUMF constitutes
an authorizing statute, effectively superseding FISA’s provisions with respect to the post-9/11 NSA activities.224
Although the AUMF argument is couched as statutory in
nature, it rests in substantial part on constitutional interpretation—specifically, on a very broad reading of presidential power
under Article II. This fact is manifested most obviously in the
administration’s constitutional avoidance argument, whereby it
argues that any statutory ambiguity should be resolved in the
administration’s favor to avoid the risk of “infring[ing] on the
President’s Commander-in-Chief powers.”225 The administration deems such powers at their height with respect to “matters
requiring secrecy—and intelligence in particular.”226 This vision of Article II also underscores the administration’s reading
of the AUMF more generally. In explaining its view that “the
AUMF is a ‘statute’ authorizing surveillance outside the confines of FISA,”227 the administration cites “the Framers’ decision to vest the President with primary constitutional authority
to defend the Nation from foreign attack” and attributes the
decision largely to “the fact that the Executive can act quickly,
decisively, and flexibly as needed.”228 The administration elaborates that, “[i]n emergency situations, Congress must be able to
use broad language that effectively sanctions the President’s
use of the core incidents of military force. That is precisely
what Congress did when it passed the AUMF on September 14,

222. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 10–17; Gonzales Transcript,
supra note 218, at 13−15.
223. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 109 (2000))
(emphasis added by the DOJ); see also Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at
13.
224. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 23−28; Gonzales Transcript,
supra note 218, at 47.
225. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 29.
226. Id. at 30.
227. Id. at 28.
228. Id. at 25.
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2001—just three days after the deadly attacks on America.”229
Given the respective constitutional roles of the President and
Congress, then, a broadly worded force authorization passed
during a national emergency implicitly amends statutes that
the President deems to constrain his use of the incidents of
force.
This theory is most directly invoked in the administration’s
constitutional argument. The two-part argument is that: (1) the
NSA program is legitimate even if the AUMF does not authorize it because Article II of the Constitution gives the President
the inherent power to create such programs, particularly in
times of crisis;230 and (2) If FISA conflicts with such inherent
powers, then FISA is unconstitutional because it interferes unduly with Article II of the Constitution.231 The administration
has only rarely made the second point definitively.232 Instead, it
repeatedly has stated that FISA likely would be deemed unconstitutional if the issue were forced.233 Yet despite the administration’s attempt to obscure its reliance on the second point,234
it must prevail on this point should its statutory argument fail.
If the AUMF is not deemed to amend FISA, then FISA constitutes the controlling statutory authority. There is no serious
dispute that the administration authorized warrantless surveillance of telephone calls governed by FISA’s warrant requirements.235 Thus, if forced to rely on its constitutional point, the
administration must prevail not only on the notion that the
President’s inherent powers authorize the NSA program, but

229. Id.
230. Id. at 6−10; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 21−23.
231. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3.
232. Id. (“[I]f this difficult constitutional question had to be addressed,
FISA would be unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context.”).
233. Id. (stating that if the issue of FISA’s constitutionality regarding this
subject were forced, it “would be called into very serious doubt”); Gonzales
Transcript, supra note 218, at 61 (responding, when asked about the constitutionality of a surveillance program that violates a statute: “I haven’t done the
detailed work that obviously these kinds of questions require. These are tough
questions. But I believe that the President does have the authority under the
Constitution”); cf. id. at 33 (stating that whether the President may authorize
warrantless surveillance in the wake of contrary legislation is a “much harder
question” than that of inherent power absent conflicting legislation); id. at 85
(“I believe that . . . there would be some serious constitutional questions there.
But I am not prepared at this juncture to say absolutely that if the AUMF argument does not work here, that FISA is unconstitutional as applied.”).
234. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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on the notion that FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it
interferes with the program.
The constitutional theory on which the administration relies to make these points is the same theory that it uses to bolster its reading of the AUMF. Again, the administration emphasizes the Framers’ creation of a President designed to act
quickly, efficiently and secretly.236 The administration explains
that the presidential office was designed in this way so that the
President can protect the nation effectively, and that the President has inherent authority to do so through surveillance and
other means.237 Congress is deemed to tread on dangerous constitutional ground when it restricts such powers.238
B. THE ADMINISTRATION’S MISTAKES ABOUT SECRECY AND
SEPARATED POWERS
The administration’s legal errors are wide-ranging. But
one claim stands out as a linchpin to which various tenuous arguments are tethered: That is, the administration’s core secrecy
claim—the notion that national security required that the surveillance program’s very existence be secret, that requesting
congressional approval of the program would have let the proverbial cat out of the bag, and that it is the President’s right
and responsibility to keep secrets under such circumstances.
From this follows the administration’s claim that the AUMF
encompasses the power to engage in surveillance that deviates
from FISA’s directives where the President deems such secret
policy necessary. It also follows, according to the administration, that Article II empowers the President to so act and that
this constitutional license trumps FISA’s statutory provisions.
Indeed, we see the administration’s reliance on the secrecy
point in the pieces of its argument cited above. Recall that the
administration, in defending the NSA program, deemed the
President’s commander-in-chief power at its apex in “matters
requiring secrecy—and intelligence in particular.”239 Recall also
the administration’s emphasis on the President’s special capacity for secrecy.240 Furthermore, when testifying before Congress, Attorney General Gonzales was quick to “clarify” that
236. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7, 25.
237. See id. at 9−10, 25; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 12, 21−23.
238. See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 3, 28−36; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 60.
239. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.

KITROSSER_4FMT

1200

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1163

the administration avoided seeking congressional approval because of the secrecy imperative, after he had used language
suggesting that such approval was not sought because it would
be politically difficult to obtain it.241
The administration’s arguments badly misconstrue the relationship between secrecy and separated powers. The remainder of this Subpart outlines the administration’s major missteps in this regard. As noted above, the administration largely
blends its statutory and constitutional arguments. That is, the
administration relies on an extremely broad reading of the
President’s Article II power to build and maintain entire programs in secret. It uses this reading both as an independent
argument about constitutional power and to justify very broad
interpretations of any statutory authorizations to the President. Given the administration’s approach, this Subpart’s responsive points for the most part do not distinguish between
the administration’s statutory and constitutional arguments.
Where such distinction is not made, it is because the responsive
points at issue engage both the administration’s broad reading
of Article II and its companion conclusion that the AUMF empowers the President to circumvent statutory obligations—
including FISA—that the President deems obstructive of his
ability to use force.
1. Conflating Macro-Secrecy and Micro-Secrecy
The administration’s arguments conflate macro-secrecy
and micro-secrecy. That is, it assumes, with very little explanation, that the need to conduct surveillance in secret necessarily
means that the program permitting such surveillance itself
must be secret. Bruce Ackerman made this point shortly after
the NSA program came to light, deeming President Bush’s
claimed secrecy needs to be grounded in:
a simple confusion between creating the spying program and implementing it: Once the NSA begins spying on particular Americans,
leaks about the details might well endanger national security. But
this point is irrelevant with respect to this key question: Why didn’t
he let us know he was creating the new spying initiative in the first
place?242

This problem has overlapping practical and legal elements.
On a practical level, it is difficult to imagine why knowledge of
the precise legal framework for conducting covert surveillance
241. See Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 14.
242. See Ackerman, supra note 5.
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would advantage terrorists who already know that they can be
spied on covertly. To the very limited extent that the Bush administration has deigned to engage this question, their answer
seems to be that such knowledge reminds “the enemy” of what
it already knows but might have forgotten. This “logic” is reflected in testimony by Attorney General Gonzales before the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
I think, based on my experience, it is true. You would assume that the
enemy is presuming that we are engaged in some kind of surveillance.
But if they are not reminded about it all the time in the newspapers
and in stories, they sometimes forget, and you’re amazed at some of
the communications that exist. And so, but when you keep sticking it
. . . in their face that we are involved in some kind of surveillance,
even if it is unclear in these stories, it can’t help but make a difference, I think.243

This substantial practical problem with the administration’s secrecy argument is underscored by a deeper problem of
constitutional law. The Constitution’s Framers were hardly
oblivious to the risks posed by a dangerous world. As Jason
Mazzone writes:
With more than two centuries of national government behind us,
it is easy to forget that in the early years following the Revolutionary
War, it was far from certain that the American experiment in independence would ultimately succeed. Eighteenth-century America was
a precarious setting. Although they had defeated the British, Americans remained preoccupied with the notion that there were forces
conspiring against their freedom. These fears were not the reflection
of unfounded paranoia. As Gordon Wood notes, “The Federalists were
. . . not mistaken in their sense of the fragility of the United States. It
was the largest republic since ancient Rome, and as such it was continually in danger of falling apart.”
....
In addition to external attacks, violence might erupt from within.
Sleeper cells might seem a new evil, but eighteenth-century Americans took for granted that foreign sympathizers were living among
them, biding their time for the right moment to strike or to stir up
trouble . . . .244

Mindful of the many dangers posed to national security, to
liberty and to wisdom, the Framers struck the balance embodied by separation of powers generally and the macrotransparency directive in particular. That is, the Framers designed a Constitution generally requiring openness and deliberation in the crafting of policy. At the nation’s disposal, how243. Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218, at 107.
244. Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 37−38
(2005).
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ever, would be a powerful executive capable of implementing
such policy in secret. For the President to run a secret program
for years and then to defend it with a barely explained assurance that openness would have been too dangerous to employ,
makes a mockery of the Framers’ design.
2. Conflating Zone Two and Zone Three Actions
The administration also tends to conflate Jacksonian zone
two actions and Jacksonian zone three actions.245 The administration frequently emphasizes that it has inherent power to
conduct surveillance absent congressional approval.246 Assuming such zone two power, however, it is not at all clear that this
would translate to zone three power should the power be used
in the face of contrary legislation such as FISA. As noted earlier, the administration deemphasizes the zone three question,
at times stating that a zone three action likely would be constitutional and at times avoiding that question entirely and focusing on its zone two arguments.247 However, the administration
cannot avoid the zone three question should they not prevail on
the point that the AUMF overrides FISA’s requirements.248 If
FISA’s requirements apply, then the administration’s actions
are legal only if FISA is unconstitutional to the extent that it
overrides the President’s power to operate the NSA program.249
What is most important is that the administration’s conflating of zone two and zone three actions obscures the significance of the distinction for separated powers generally and for
the macro-transparency directive in particular. As noted earlier, zone two actions are less presumptively legitimate than
zone one actions because the former are not the product of the
legislative process with its deliberation and transparency based
protections. At the same time, there are important constitutional advantages to zone two actions that give them much
greater presumptive legitimacy than zone three actions. First,
zone two actions simply do not stray as far as do zone three ac245. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Jacksonian power zones).
246. See supra notes 230−37 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 232−33 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 234−35 and accompanying text.
249. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkanization, http://balkin
.blogspot.com (July 23, 2006, 21:20 EST) (pointing out that it is a mistake to
conflate inherent power with the power to act in the face of a conflicting statute, and that Senator Specter makes this mistake in emphasizing the administration’s inherent power to conduct surveillance in Arlen Specter, Op-Ed.,
Surveillance We Can Live With, WASH. POST, July 24, 2006, at A19).

KITROSSER_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:16:58 AM

“MACRO-TRANSPARENCY” DIRECTIVE

1203

tions from the macro-transparency directive. While zone two
actions are not flagged publicly by legislation (or, in the case of
the grey space between zone one and zone two,250 they are
flagged only by an extremely broad legislative delegation under
which countless executive decisions could fall), they also do not
occur in the face of public, legislative reassurance that they will
not occur. This has important implications for public knowledge
and for the legislature’s ability to perform its oversight and legislative responsibilities. A common lament about the NSA’s secret post-9/11 activities, for example, is that Congress focused
publicly on balancing civil liberties and national security
through post-9/11 amendments to FISA, while the administration secretly and unilaterally granted itself additional exemptions from FISA.251
Second, Congress obviously knows how to refrain from
passing legislation or to leave legislation so broad as to create a
zone two situation or a grey space between zone two and zone
one (in which legislation is so broad as to encompass a wide
range of conceivable executive actions). Congress thus has the
tools to permit precisely the degree of presidential discretion
that the administration indicates it wished to have with respect
to surveillance. Indeed, such discretion existed, in large part,
prior to the Church hearings and to FISA’s creation. When
Congress chooses to alter or eliminate such discretion, the public, legislative process through which such alteration occurs,
along with any dialogue or oversight that accompanied or preceded that process, substantially bolsters the legitimacy of this
choice. Such transparency, dialogue and investigation are
hallmarks of the legislative structure and structurally are far
less likely to be present where the President chooses to ignore
such legislative imperatives.
3. Overlooking Congressional Authority to Manage
Information Dissemination
The Bush administration also has operated under the view
250. See supra notes 102−03 and accompanying text.
251. See Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Varied Rationales Muddle Issue of
NSA Eavesdropping, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at A5 (“Before the program’s
existence was revealed, several administration officials also emphasized in
testimony and public statements that the NSA was prohibited from engaging
in domestic surveillance—even as the agency was clearly doing so under the
authority of Bush’s secret order that established the program.”); see also, e.g.,
Carol D. Leonnig, Gonzales is Challenged on Wiretaps, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2006, at A7.
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that it has the discretion to pick and choose which members of
Congress, if any, shall be notified of its intelligence programs
and that it further may prescribe the terms under which those
members shall be briefed. The administration apparently
waited for a substantial time period after the NSA program began to notify congresspersons of its existence.252 After that time
period, it did not notify Congress or even the congressional intelligence committees as a whole, but rather notified the congressional “Gang of Eight”253 comprised of “the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence
committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate.”254 Reports from some “Gang of Eight” members indicate that they were notified only under strict non-disclosure
conditions.255 Among other things, they were not permitted to
consult with or to share any of the information that they
learned with their staff or with other members of Congress.256
The problems with the Bush administration’s approach to
congressional disclosure are multi-fold. First, on a practical
level, it is impossible to have effective congressional oversight
when information is conveyed only to a handful of congresspersons on the condition that they not repeat it. Second, and more
fundamentally, the executive branch once again ignored the
fact that it is constrained by Congress’s macro-directives, including with respect to information-sharing. Indeed, congressional information-sharing directives serve constitutional
transparency values on two levels—first, in their general legitimacy as macro-transparent rules, and second, in their management of information between executive, legislature and the
public. In this case, the administration ignored its statutory responsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees

252. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 20.
253. Id.; see also, e.g., Suzanne Spaulding, Power Play, Did Bush Roll Past
the Legal Signs?, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1.
254. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
255. For accounts of the “Gang of Eight” hearings, see CUMMING, supra
note 189, at 7; Eggen & Pincus, supra note 251; Spencer S. Hsu & Walter Pincus, Goss Says Leaks Have Hurt CIA’s Work, Urges Probe, WASH. POST, Feb. 3,
2006; Eric Lichtblau & David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War Vote in
Spying Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A1; Nancy Pelosi, Op-Ed., The Gap
in Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at B7.
256. See CUMMING, supra note 189, at 7; Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note
255, at A1.
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“fully and currently informed” of intelligence activities.257
Third, the executive branch also sweeps too broadly in its unilateral determination that disclosure on statutory terms—in
this case, disclosure to the intelligence committees—would
have been too dangerous to undertake. As noted above, the administration’s only proffered argument for keeping the program’s very existence secret is laughable (literally so, as the
transcript that records the justification records simultaneous
laughter).258 More important, it is not for the executive branch
to make this unilateral determination in the face of a conflicting statutory mandate. Rather, it is for Congress, through
statutory terms and through its Constitutional power to make
rules for its proceedings, to set the macro-framework under
which information disclosure, including any negotiations between executive and legislature on that score, can take place.
Indeed, current rules provide mechanisms by which committees
to which classified information is disclosed can determine
whether the public interest will be served by declassifying and
disclosing the information.259 Such determinations also took
place during the Church hearings.260 Openness can, of course,
pose dangers. But so can secrecy, as our recent intelligence disasters and countless other historical missteps attest.261 The
Framers struck a balance by leaving it to Congress to establish
macro-transparent rules, including rules as to information disclosure. The executive is left to implement the rules, sometimes
in secret, and sometimes through give-and-take with Congress.

257. See supra notes 190−91 and accompanying text. The NSA program did
not fit any of the exceptions that would justify notifying only the “Gang of
Eight.” Plainly, the program did not meet the careful statutory definition of a
covert action. See supra notes 194−96 and accompanying text. Nor did the
program’s very existence meet the “source and methods” exception for full notification. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Indeed, the only source
or method arguably protected by non-disclosure to Congress is the “method” of
operating a program in contravention of statutory directives. Such an exception would not only swallow the rule, it would make an utter mockery of it.
258. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
259. See CAP REPORT, supra note 107, at 27 (noting, however, that such
rules “have never been utilized,” and that “the threat of going public” thus “is
not realistic”).
260. See Church NSA Hearings, supra note 105, at 51−52, 57−58.
261. See Kitrosser, supra note 9, at 510−27 (citing analyses of current and
historical intelligence failures caused by secrecy).
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4. Abusing the Concept of “Emergency” and the Relationship
of Such Abuse to Secrecy and Separated Powers
The administration’s arguments also stretch the concept of
emergency presidential power to the breaking point. The President’s speed and vigor is intended in part to enable him or her
to respond to immediate emergencies. In rare cases, an emergency may justify even the circumvention of statutory mandates. However, the concept of emergency must be rare and
temporally limited. “Once the immediate emergency passes, the
transparency, dialogue and other protections of the legislative
process must be invoked to legitimize any continuing activities
that fall outside of existing statutory mandates.”262 Otherwise,
the concept of “emergency” action is indistinguishable from
long-term secretive, even deceptive rule by executive fiat, justified by the bare fact that we live in a dangerous world. In conducting a secret program for roughly four years before it was
discovered through press leaks and in offering no plausible justification for such long-term secrecy, the administration engaged in precisely such deceptive, unilateral rule.
The administration also bypassed FISA’s emergency provisions enabling seventy-two-hour, emergency warrantless surveillance263 or warrantless surveillance for fifteen days following a declaration of war.264 The administration has suggested
that these exceptions were insufficient to meet its needs in the
wake of 9/11.265 This, however, is a policy argument that the
Constitution demands be put to the test of the macrotransparent legislative process, even if the result of that process is to authorize secretive implementation.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s Framers placed much faith in the people of this country to govern themselves. Yet they also understood the vast human capacity to abuse power. Their resulting
constitutional design provided for multiple separated and overlapping powers so that “ambition [might] counteract ambi-

262. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The discussion of this exception assumes, for the sake of argument, that the AUMF constitutes a declaration of war. This is not an entirely uncontroversial proposition. See Bazan
& Elsea, supra note 2, at 26−27.
265. See generally Gonzales Transcript, supra note 218.
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tion,”266 with abuses in one part of government likely to be
caught by another part or exposed by the press. As James
Madison wrote, “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions” through structural checks and balances.267 A requisite element of this protective structure is macro-transparency. Thus, while the executors
of federal policies—namely the President and the executive
branch—may be authorized or inherently empowered to conduct particular activities in secret, they remain subject to
checking through transparent statutory directives and to congressional oversight that itself is governed by macrotransparent information control rules. This macrotransparency directive is dynamic in effect. Congressional oversight, for example, may reveal one secret that can lead to the
stripping away of additional layers of secret activity. And illegal conduct may be revealed and may lead to judicial activities
that are themselves revelatory in nature.
The Framers’ brilliant design can go a long way toward
saving us from ourselves. A watchful press, for example, might
shame a sleeping Congress into assessing executive corruption,
which might in turn activate judicial processes and corrective,
macro-transparent legislative measures. To some extent this is
the story, as of late September 2006, of the post-9/11 NSA surveillance controversy. While a fearful public, press and Congress remained largely idle in the years after 9/11, The New
York Times finally revealed the NSA program’s existence after
sitting on the story for over a year. And this sparked some
measure of public and congressional outrage in the months that
followed, with some congressional hearings held, some legislative proposals offered and some judicial relief sought.
But the story of the recent NSA surveillance controversy is
also a story about our system’s ultimate reliance on the people.
When all is said and done, the people simply must care enough
about statutory and constitutional evasions for exposure to fuel
and sustain government’s checking mechanisms. It remains to
be seen whether the people and their representatives will rise
to this challenge with respect to the surveillance controversy.
While some congressional hearings indeed have been held, oth-

266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 21, at 322.
267. Id.
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ers have been avoided or substantially curtailed.268 And in the
hearings that have been held, witnesses’ claims to be not at liberty to answer particular inquiries often have prevailed without question.269 Furthermore, while responsive legislation has
not been passed as of mid-November 2006, there remains a
chance at this point that legislation largely authorizing the
program will pass the lame-duck, Republican-dominated Congress.270
Our constitutional system’s ultimate dependence on the
people is well reflected in Learned Hand’s famous admonition
that “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women. When it dies
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.”271 But
there is another way that liberty can die. Liberty can die when
systemic mechanisms meant to protect it break down beyond
repair. The latter death has been threatened, since 9/11, by the
NSA program and by similar acts of executive aggrandizement.
It says much about our system’s structural strength that
transparency eventually prevailed and that public, legislative
and judicial reactions followed. Whether those reactions sustain themselves, and what form they take over time, will tell us
much about whether liberty prevails in our hearts.

268. See The Death of the Intelligence Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at
A22; Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Blocks Eavesdropping Probe, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 2006, at A1; Patrick Radden Keefe, Orwell Would Be Proud, SLATE,
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137796/.
269. See, e.g., An Ever Expanding Secret, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A32
(mentioning that Attorney General Gonzales declined to comment on certain
matters before the Judiciary Committee).
270. In light of the 2006 elections that returned a Democratic majority to
both houses of Congress, it is unclear whether such legislation will pass. See
Gonzales Attacks Ruling Against Domestic Spying, AP, Nov. 18, 2006, available at http://www.jonesreport.com/articles/181106_gonzales_attacks_
ruling.html.
271. See Bartleby.com, http://www.bartleby.com/73/1059.html (quoting
Learned Hand, The Spirit of American Liberty, Speech at the “I Am an American Day” Ceremony at Central Park, New York, N.Y. (May 21, 1944)).

